

Message Text

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ACTION ACDA-19

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 IO-14 ISO-00 CIAE-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-10

L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-07 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SPC-03 SS-20

USIA-15 NEA-10 TRSE-00 SAJ-01 ACDE-00 AEC-11 AECE-00

OMB-01 SAM-01 OIC-04 DRC-01 /162 W
----- 038880

P R 081746Z MAR 74

FM AMEMBASSY BONN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0966

SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY PARIS

AMEMBASSY ROME

AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS

AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE

AMEMBASSY VIENNA

USMISSION GENEVA

USMISSION NATO BRUSSELS

USDEL SALT TWO GENEVA

USNMR SHAPE

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BONN 03785

NOFORN

VIENNA FOR MBFR DEL

GENEVA FOR CSCE DEL AND DISTO

SHAPE FOR INTAF

E. O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, GW

SUBJECT: MBFR VERIFICATION

REF: BONN 3467 - NOTAL

BEGIN SUMMARY: FONOFF HAS PROVIDED EMBASSY ON NOFORN

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BASIS WITH ADVANCE VIEW OF FRG POSITION ON MBFR VERIFI-

CATION TO BE PRESENTED, PERHAPS LATE NEXT WEEK, IN NATO. GERMANS ARGUE THAT ALLIES MUST STRIKE BALANCE BETWEEN POLITICAL ACCEPTABILITY AND TECHNICAL EFFECIENCY, AND THAT FOR PHASE I U.S. REDUCTIONS LIMITED TO FRG TERRITORY, PRIORITY SHOULD BE ATTACHED TO LIMITING VERIFICATION TO POLITICALLY ACCEPTABLE MEASURES--I.E., VERIFICATION OF FORCE WITHDRAWALS BY MOBILE TEAMS (AND STATIC POSTS) BUT VERIFICATION OF FORCE LEVELS BY NTM. FONOFF REP ALSO COMMENTED, AS REPORTED BELOW, ON POSSIBLE VERIFICATION MEASURES IN PHASE II, INDICATING UNDERSTANDING THAT BROADER TERRITORIAL SCOPE AND EXPERIENCE FROM MBFR-I MIGHT JUSTIFY MORE ELABORATE VERIFICATION IN PHASE II. END SUMMARY

1. HAUBER, FONOFF DIRECTOR FOR DISARMAMENT VERIFICATION, REQUESTED EMBOFF TO CALL ON HIM MARCH 8 FOR ADVANCE BRIEFING CONCERNING GERMAN MBFR POSITION TO BE PRESENTED PERHAPS LATE NEXT WEEK AT NATO. HAUBER SAID THIS ADVANCE BRIEFING BEING PROVIDED ONLY TO USG AND ASKED THAT IT BE KEPT NOFORN. HE SAID DEFENSE MINISTRY HAD NOT YET FULLY CLEARED OFF ON INSTRUCTIONS, WHICH HE READ TO EMBOFF, BUT WAS CONFIDENT THAT MOD WOULD DO SO SOMETIME NEXT WEEK.

2. HAUBER SAID THE GERMANS HAD CONCLUDED THAT THE PHASED APPROACH, WHICH CHARACTERIZED THE ALLIED MBFR POSITION, SHOULD ALSO BE EMPLOYED ON VERIFICATION ISSUES. BONN THOUGHT IT WOULD BE EASIER TO FIND COMMON ALLIED POSITIONS IF NATO WOULD CONCENTRATE AT THIS TIME ON MBFR-I ASPECTS OF VERIFICATION. HE SAID IT WOULD BE VERY HARD NOW TO MAKE MORE OR LESS BINDING JUDGMENTS FOR THE WHOLE MBFR PROCESS. PRACTICALLY SPEAKING, THE FRG BELIEVED THE ALLIANCE WAS UNDER NO PARTICULAR PRESSURE AT THIS PRESENT TIME TO DEFINE ITS POSITION ON VERIFICATION IN MBFR-II. THE MAIN GERMAN CONCERN IS THE POSSIBLE DETRIMENTAL IMPLICATIONS FOR THOSE STATES WHOSE TERRITORY WOULD BE MAINLY AFFECTED BY VERIFICATION. HAUBER RECALLED THE LONG STANDING GERMAN POSITION AGAINST MBFR MEASURES LIMITED SOLELY TO GERMAN TERRITORY; HE NOTED THAT ONLY FRG TERRITORY WOULD BE AFFECTED BY MBFR

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I VERIFICATION MEASURES.

3. HAUBER SAID THAT TECHNICAL EFFICIENCY AND POLITICAL ACCEPTABILITY OF VERIFICATION APPEAR TO BE IN AN OBVERSE RELATIONSHIP. IN CONSIDERING POLITICAL ACCEPTABILITY, THE GERMAN PREFERENCE WOULD BE FIRST FOR NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS (NTM), AND THEREAFTER FOR LIMITED TIME MOBILE INSPECTION OF WITHDRAWALS, INSPEC-

TION BY CHALLENGE, FIXED PERIMETER OR CHECK POINT POSTS
AND LASTLY PERMANENT INSPECTION BY MOBILE TEAMS OF
POST REDUCTION FORCE LEVELS. AS TO TECHNICAL EFFICIENCY,
HAUBER SAID THE REVERSE ORDER PROBABLY WOULD
OBTAIN.

4. HAUBER SAID THE GERMANS WISH TO FIND A BALANCED
SOLUTION BETWEEN TECHNICAL EFFICIENCY AND POLITICAL
ACCEPTABILITY. BONN SEES A QUALITATIVE DIFFERENCE

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P R 081746Z MAR 74

FM AMEMBASSY BONN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0967

SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON

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BETWEEN THE TWO MBFR PHASES. MBFR I WOULD BE LIMITED TO U.S. WITHDRAWALS FROM GERMAN TERRITORY WHILE MBFR II WOULD INVOLVE OTHER EUROPEAN FORCES AND TERRITORY AND REDUCTIONS WOULD BE ON A LARGER SCALE THAN IN PHASE I. THUS, IT WOULD BE SOMEWHAT EASIER TO VERIFY MBFR I U.S./SOVIET WITHDRAWALS, AS COMPLEMENTED BY NON-CIRCUMVENTION PROVISIONS. ASIDE FROM LARGER SCOPE OF MBFR II, BONN THINKS IT PREMATURE TO ADDRESS MBFR II VERIFICATION WHEN THE ALLIANCE HAS NOT EVEN MADE A START ON THE ISSUE OF COMPOSITION OR CHARACTER OF MBFR REDUCTIONS OF INDIGENOUS FORCES.

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5. IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, THE FRG WOULD CONSIDER IT UNWISE TO ACCEPT PERMANENT INSPECTION PROVISIONS IN PHASE I, WITHOUT KNOWING WHETHER MBFR II WILL EVEN COME OR WHAT IT MIGHT LOOK LIKE. IN MBFR I, BONN FAVORS SUBORDINATING TECHNICAL PERFECTION TO POLITICAL ACCEPTABILITY.

6. HAUBER THEN ADDRESSED THOSE PRACTICAL MEASURES WHICH MIGHT BE BOTH POLITICALLY ACCEPTABLE AND TECHNICALLY SUFFICIENT IN PHASE I. THE FRG WOULD FAVOR THE SUPERVISION OF FORCE WITHDRAWALS BY MOBILE INSPECTION TEAMS, AND IF DESIRABLE, STATIC POSTS, DURING THE TIME OF ACTUAL WITHDRAWALS; THE MOBILE TEAMS WOULD CEASE TO EXIST AFTER WITHDRAWAL HAD BEEN EFFECTUATED. MBFR I POST-REDUCTION LEVELS WOULD BE SUPERVISED BY NTM. BONN UNDERSTANDS THAT THE SOVIETS MIGHT WISHTO TERM THIS MBFR I VERIFICATION APPROACH A PRECEDENT FOR MBFR-II VERIFICATION. HAUBER SAID THIS IS NOT THE GERMAN INTENTION AND THAT ALLIED MBFR DELS IN VIENNA SHOULD SAY THIS AT AN APPROPRIATE TIME.

7. EMBOFF THEN INQUIRED CONCERNING FRG ATTITUDE TOWARD MBFR-II VERIFICATION. HAUBER SAID IT MIGHT BE MORE POLITICALLY ACCEPTABLE TO HAVE MORE TECHNICAL EFFICIENCY IN PHASE II, IN VIEW OF THE LIKELY GREATER TERRITORY AND NUMBER OF ALLIED FORCES INVOLVED; COVERAGE OF SOVIET TERRITORY WOULD FURTHER FACILITATE ENHANCED TECHNICAL VERIFICATION MEASURES. HAUBER SAID THE GERMANS HAVE SOME UNDERSTANDING FOR THE ACDA ARGUMENT CONCERNING USE OF MBFR VERIFICATION AS A TEST OR PRECEDENT MAKING CASE ON OVERT INSPECTION. HOWEVER, HE THOUGHT THIS POINT WAS ONLY VALID IF SUCH MEASURES WERE APPLIED TO SOVIET TERRITORY--I.E., THE SOVIET WESTERN MILITARY DISTRICTS--AS THIS COULD INCREASE ALLIED WARNING TIME. AS TO SPECIFIC MEASURES IN MBFR II, HAUBER SAID HE WOULD HESITATE AT THIS TIME TO EXCLUDE

PERMANENT OR OVERT INSPECTION PROVISIONS, BUT MADE
CLEAR LIKELY GERMAN PREFERENCE FOR INSPECTION BY
CHALLENGE. HAUBER SAID GERMAN NATO DEL WOULD NOT
COMMENT NEXT WEEK ON EITHER SPECIFIC MEASURES IN ALLIED
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PAPER OR MBFR II VERIFICATION, PREFERRING TO FOCUS
ATTENTION FIRST ON THE OVERALL RATIONALE.

8. HAUBER MADE FOLLOWING COMMENTS IN REPLY TO EMBOFF'S
QUERIES ON ALLIED VERIFICATION PAPER, FRG AGREES THAT
VERIFICATION SHOULD FOCUS ON WITHDRAWALS AND NOT
STABILIZING MEASURES, AS LONG AS LATTER POSSIBILITY
KEPT OPEN. BONN WILL BE PREPARED TO ACCEPT COMPROMISE
SIMILAR(ALBEIT NOT IDENTICAL) TO U.S./UK FORMULATION
ON PARTICIPATION IN NTM, BUT WILL NOT ADVANCE EXACT
FORMULATION QUITE YET IN NATO AS THIS IS INTRA-ALLIANCE
PROBLEM AND IS NOT PRESENTLY REQUIRED VIS-A-VIS
SOVIETS. ON HOST COUNTRY LIAISON OFFICERS, FRG HAS
UNDERSTANDING FOR U.S. SUGGESTION THAT, FOR TACTICAL
REASONS, ALLIES PERMIT SOVIETS TO ADVANCE PROPOSAL. BUT
FRG WILL SUGGEST TO ALLIANCE THAT, IF SOVIETS DO NOT DO
SO, ALLIES SHOULD.

9. EMBOFF EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR ADVANCE BRIEFING,
RECALLED DIFFERING U.S. VIEWS (PARTICULARLY ON
NEGOTIATED OVERT MEASURES) AND UNDERTOOK TO REPORT
HAUBER'S COMMENTS TO WASHINGTON.
HILLENBRAND

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